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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JEANNIE STRINGAM,
Appellee,
V.

Case No. 20000179-CA

MORRIS MYERS. ERIN M. STOVALL,
aka ERIN M. STOVALL, JOHN
PATRICK STOVALL,
Defendants/Appellants
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT MORRIS MYERS
1.

Statement

of

jurisdiction:

The

Court

has

jurisdiction to hear this appeal by virtue of § 78-2a-3 (2)
(j), UCA 1953, as amended (1996); the case was transferred to
the Court of Appeals by Utah Supreme Court ORDER dated April
12,

2000,

"pursuant

to

Section

78-2-2(4),

Utah

Code

Annotated.If
2.

Issue and standard of review:

Did the trial court

commit prejudicial error in denying DEFENDANT MYERS' POSTTRIAL MOTIONS (r. 865-868, 869-872; 915-916, 917-918; 947-955,
ORDER ON DEFENDANT MORRIS MYERS POST-TRIAL MOTIONS) for an
order dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the grounds and for
the reasons that under the facts and the law she [plaintiff]
has shown no right to relief, and for plaintiff's failure to
make the balloon payment of $134,043.24, for an order that the
Agreement

at

issue,

and

all

rights

of

the

plaintiff

thereunder, are forfeited and that defendant Myers is entitled

to a judgment of forfeiture, as well as for restitution of the
premises, eviction, damages and quiet title; and whether
defendant Erin M. Stovall is entitled to any amount under her
"equitable lien against the American Fork property in the sum
of one-half of all proceeds received in excess of $109,000,00,
which lien should become payable upon the sale of the real
property."

(Exh. 54, p. 7; r. 527-533; 550-557)

Standard

of

review:

The

trial

court's

legal

determinations are granted no deference.

Standard Fed. Sav.

&

1136

(Utah

the

agreement

Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride. 821 P.2d

Threshold

question

of whether

ambiguous is a question of law.

or

not

1991);
is

Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552

(Utah App. 1994); is the agreement

to be interpreted as a

question of law determined by the words of the agreement, or
a question of fact determined by extrinsic evidence of intent?
If the language

of the agreement

is not ambiguous the

appellate court can review, as a matter of law, the agreement
under a correctness standard; if the agreement is ambiguous
and the trial court makes findings of fact, appellate review
is strictly

limited.

Copper

State

Leasing

v.

Blacker

Appliancef 770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988); A contract provision is
ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing
terms, or other facial deficiencies.

Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d

1262 (Utah App. 1994).
"The Court will disturb the trial court's decision in
2

plaintiff's favor only if its findings are clarly erroneous
(citations omitted). The clearly erroneous standard requires
that if the findings are against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the
findings will be set aside (citations omitted).

Questions

about the legal adequacy of findings of fact and the legal
accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues of
law, which the appellate court reviews for correctness,
according

no

deference

to

the

trial

court

(citations

omitted).11 State ex rel. C.K.r 996 P.2d 1059 (Utah App. 2000)
Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc. , 804 P.2d 547 (Utah App.
1991),

a court asked to interpret a contract may first

inquire as to whether the contract is integrated.

Because

this is a factual determination, review by an appellate court
is limited. An integrated contract is an agreement where the
parties thereto adopt a writing or writings is the final and
complete expression of the agreement.
parties will be enforced.
P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981).

The intent of the

Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp.f 638
If a contract is determined to

be integrated, the parol evidence rule excludes evidence of
terms in addition to those found in the agreement.

If the

contract is in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the
intention of the parties must be determined from the words of
the agreement. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d
(Utah 1991)
3

104, 108

3. Statutes, rules, etc*

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure

54(b),
"Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved,
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one
or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon
an express determination by the court that there is no just
reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry
of judgment.
In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however
designated which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and
the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
Rule 52(a) [Findings by the court*] Effect. In all actions
tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the court shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered
pursuant to Rule 58A; . . .Findings of fact, whether based on
oral or documentary evidence shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility the
witness. * * *
4»

Statement of the case:

As a preliminary matter, in

regards to the appealed ADDENDUM TO FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT

dated February 4, 2000, (r. 1021-1026) the trial court entered
judgment in plaintiff's favor awarding attorney fees in an
undetermined amount. [A trial court must determine the amount
of attorney fees awardable to a party before the judgment
becomes final for the purposes of an appeal under Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 3. ProMax Development v. Raile, 998 P.2d
254 (Utah 2000)] Since the February 4, 2000 ADDENDUM did not
dispose of the plaintiff's claim for attorney fees, and did
not contain a special finding under rule 54(b) URCiP it was in
4

all respects interlocutory. Plaintiff's request for attorneys
fees was in all respects a "claim" for purposes of rule 54(b)
and, therefore, because the ADDENDUM left the amount of
attorneys fees undetermined, it did not resolve all the claims
in the case and was not a final judgment.

Home State

Bank/National Ass'n v. Potokarf 617 N.E. 2d 1302, 1308-1310
(Ill.App. 1993).

Since the ADDENDUM lacked a special finding

under rule 54(b) it was not subject to enforcement and must be
reversed.

D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah App.

1992).
A court is without jurisdiction to amend or vacate its
judgments once final judgment has been entered. Inland Group
of Companies v. Obendorff, 959 P.2d 454 (Idaho 1998)
In the case of the appealed FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT
dated January 31, 2000 (r. 997-1018), plaintiff Stringam is in
all respects the "winner."

Parties not aggrieved by a

judgment have no right to appeal therefrom.

Poage v. Co-

operative Pub. Co., 66 P.2d 1119 (Idaho 1933).

Generally, a

party may not appeal from a judgment in his favor. Commercial
Block Realty Co. v. U.S. Fidelity Co. , 28 P.2d 1081 (Utah
1934).
On April 17, 2000, appellant Myers filed with the Court
his motion to dismiss appellee's cross-appeal.
Clerk

informed

[thereby]

are

appellant Myers that
deferred

until

"the

plenary

The Court

issues raised

presentation

and

consideration of the case." pursuant to the Court's ORDER
5

DENYING AND DEFERRING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION, dated
and filed June 14, 2000.
Nature of the case.

Stringam and Erin Stovall entered

into an agreement in writing (Plaintiff's Exh. 1, r. 249-43,
392-96, 534-37, and 558-61).

In a recital to the agreement

the parties to the agreement declare their desire "of entering
into a joint venture arrangement respecting certain real
property at 98 West 500 North, American Fork, Utah,. . ." and
in a further recital to the agreement state "their intentions
and agreement as to the entitlement to and distribution of
profits in the event of sale of said property which is the
ultimate purpose of this joint venture, . . . "

[para. 11 of

the agreement provides, "[a]t such time as the property is
sold the net proceeds of the sale shall be distributed as
follows:

A.

indebtedness.

To payment of the underlying trust deed
B.

The amount of the net proceeds as shall

exceed $109,000 shall be divided equally between First and
Second Parties.]
Paragraphs 9. and 10. respectively, provide "It is agreed
that time is of the essence of this agreement" and "This
agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties
hereto. Any provisions hereof not enforceable under the laws
of the State of Utah shall not effect the validity of any
other provisions hereof."
At the time of the agreement [October, 1990] Erin Stovall
owned

the property;

Stringams
6

occupied

the

property

as

renters. A further recital to the agreement recites the
structuring of the joint venture "contemplates the purchase by
[Stringam] from [Stovall] of said property .

.

."

The

Agreement itself [para. 3] provides that [Stringam] agrees to
pay [Erin Stovall] for the property the purchase price of
$109,000 on the following terms:

$800 each month commencing

August 1, 1990, for eighty four months, and the entire balance
remaining

shall be due and payable on August 1, 1997;

interest on principal amounts remaining from time to time
unpaid shall be at the rate of 11% per annum. *

* *,f

A further recital to the Agreement states, WHEREAS, First
Party [Stringam] and Second Party fStovalll intend hereby to
*

*

^provide termination and default provisions.
Paragraph 8. of the agreement provides,

"Should First Party fail to comply with any of the terms
hereof, Second Party shall give First Party written notice
specifically setting forth the provisions under which First
Party is in default. Should First Party fail to cure such
default within 30 day [sic] after said notice, Second Party
may, in addition to any other remedies afforded Second Party
by law, elect any of the following remedies:
A. Second Party may be released from all obligations in
law and equity to convey the property, and First Party shall
at once become a tenant at will of Second Party. All payments
which have been made by First Party shall be retained by
Second Party as liquidated and agreed damages for breach of
this agreement; * * *"
On August 8, 1994, Erin Stovall quit-claimed to John
Patrick Stovall (Def. Exh. 60; r. 204); on August 9, 1994,
John Patrick Stovall assigned the agreement, Exh. 1, to
appellant Myers (Exh. 1; r. 208, 239, 392, 523, and 547).

By

Warranty Deed recorded April 22, 1998, John Patrick Stovall
7

conveyed the property to appellant Myers (Def. Exh. 61; r.
378, 522, and 546)
The Agreement contained no provision for transfer of
title to Stringam; quoting the recital again, the parties
intent was to "enter[] into a joint venture arrangement"
respecting the real property; interpreted as the parties7
intent indicates, when Stringam had made the payments required
the property would become her contribution to the joint
venture, a separate and distinct legal entity. Salt Lake Knee
& Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake City, Kneww &
Sports Medicine, 909 P.2d 266 (Utah App. 1995.
48-1-3.1(1,2).

U.C.A. 1953,

Stringam materially breached the contract by

wholly failing, without excuse, to make the balloon payment,
(r. 1047, tr. 201-203; r. 1048, tr. 186)
Without paying the balloon payment Stringam eventually
sued for specific performance and quiet title (r. 265-279, and
650-664); Myers counterclaimed

for restitution, eviction,

damages and quiet title (PI. Exh. 38; r. 628-631, 641-645).
In its Final Order and Judgment (r. 997-1018) the trial
court concluded as a matter of law that 1.

The contract

between the parties is a lease/option to buy.

2.

Ms.

Stringam has a right to tender payment of the final balloon
payment thereby performing and fulfilling her obligation
the contract.

3.

on

The amount of the balloon payment is

determined to be $141,547.21 as of January 1, 2000. The trial
court decreed that 1. Once Ms. Stringam tendered the balloon
8

payment the first mortgage (Trust Deed and Note) should be
satisfied and Mr. Myers shall turn over marketable title to
Ms. Stringam.

2. One half of all proceeds over the amount of

$109,000 should be paid to Ms. Stovall in satisfaction of her
lien/interest in the property, this amount being $16,273.61.
3. The balance then remaining after paying the Trust Deed and
Note and Ms. Stovall, should be awarded to Mr. Myers. 4. Due
to the fact that the parties

involved

in this dispute

contributed to or created their own difficulties in this
matter, each party should pay their own attorneys fees and
costs, with the exception that Plaintiff's offer of judgment
in December of 1998 for $150,000.00 if accepted could have
avoided the necessity of trial. Therefore a portion of costs
and attorney fees associated with the trial of this matter
should be awarded to Plaintiff.

The Court determines Ms.

Stringam should receive $12,000.00 of her costs and attorney
fees, from Defendant Myers.
Stringam claims to have submitted an application and
affidavit of attorney's fees requesting $73,574.90 therefore.
There was no evidence demonstrating reasonableness.

Also,

Stringam did not claim her costs in the manner required by
rule 54(d)(2), URCiP.
5.

Summary of arguments.

The findings of fact of the

trial judge sitting without a jury shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous. In the instant case however, given
the clear, unambiguous language contained in the Agreement,
9

the findings of the trial judge are against the clear weight
of the evidence and contrary to the intent of the parties, and
it is evident that a mistake has been made.

Western Kane

County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744
P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987).
6. Argument.

Finding of Fact #1 recites that the

Agreement is a lease/purchase agreement; the first recital to
the Agreement declares that the parties are "desirous of
entering into a joint venture arrangement respecting certain
real property

.

.

."

The recitals to a contract are the

expression of reasons for the transaction and should be
considered

in determining

the

intent of the parties as

expressed in the entire document.

Maddux & Sonsf Inc. v.

Trustees of Arizona Laborers, Teamsters and Cement Masons,
Local 395 Health and Welfare Trust Fund, 610 P.2d 477 (Ariz.
App. 1980)
Finding of Fact #1 further recites that pursuant to the
agreement Stringam agrees to make $800.00 monthly payments
until August 1, 1997, when the balance of the trust deed was
to become

due.

Agreement,

as

To the contrary,
gleaned

from

a

paragraph

natural

and

3. of the
reasonable

interpretation of the language used, provides that the balance
remaining due on the $109,000 purchase price after 84 $800
payments "shall be due and payable on August 1, 1997."; the
reference is not to the balance due on a "trust deed."
Finding of Fact #1 further states, "If Stringam was ever
10

unable to make the payments, she had the option to sell the
property and divide the equity with Erin Stovall.11

The

manifest meaning of the language used in the Agreement in its
entirety is not susceptible of the trial court's quoted
interpretation which directly conflicts with the intention of
the parties as stated in the Agreement, paragraph 8 and 8A, ".
.should first party fail to comply with any of the terms
[of the Agreement]. . ."
Finding #1 further finds that "Stringam continued to make
the payments (which were $800.00 of a $1,3038.00 (?) mortgage
payment). . ."

Paragraph 3. of the agreement explicitly

states ". . .the purchase price of $109,000 on the following
terms: $800 each month commencing August 1, 1990, for eightyfour months. . ."

Such finding of the trial court is

erroneous and supports the appellate court's "definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In Stringam's
defense, she is relying on the third "whereas" [recital] of
the agreement that references her conclusion, "which were
$800.00 of a $1,3038.00 (?) mortgage payment," [When the
recitals are broader than a contract's operative clauses, the
recitals cannot be used to extend or broaden the restrictions
contained in the body of the agreement.

Fugate v. Town of

Paysonf 791 P.2d 1092 (Ariz. App. 1990).
Finding #45 recites, "Stringam filed Offer of Judgment on
December 28, 1998, offering $150,000 for which judgment could
be entered.

Defendant would agree to pay costs." The offer
11

is in the record at pp. 568-570.

The finding, however, is

clearly erroneous in that the actual offer at paragraph 5.
thereof provides, "Defendant agrees to pay costs, including
reasonable attorney's fees accrued to date."

This too, would

support the appellate court's definite and firm conviction
that a mistake was made; the requirement of payment of
attorney's fees is not authorized by rule 68(b) URCiP and in
that payment of attorney's fees was included as a condition of
the offer, such offer of judgment is invalid.
In the Discussion and Analysis section of the Final Order
and Judgment (p. 18) the trial court quotes the wording of
Erin Stovall's purported equitable lien as follows, "Plaintiff
is awarded

an equitable

lien against the American

Fork

property in the sum of one-half of all proceeds received in
excess of $109,000, which lien should become payable upon the
sale of the real property."

Payment is expressly indexed to

the time of sale, October, 1990, at which time there was
$108,200 due on the sale.

Therefore, no amount is due Erin

Stovall by virtue of her equitable lien.
Conclusion of Law #1, "[t]he contract between the parties
is a lease/option to buy," is not supported by the unambiguous
language of the Agreement, is contrary thereto as being in
conflict with the intention of the parties as expressed and
contained in said Agreement.
Conclusion of Law #2, "Ms. Stringam has a right to tender
payment of the final balloon payment thereby performing and
12

fulfilling her obligation on the contract/1 is an abstract
statement of a right too broadly accorded, i.e., to give Ms.
Stringam a right to redeem more than two years after appellant
Myers had elected and given the notices as provided in
paragraph

8. A.

of

the

agreement,

foreclosure had been accomplished.

whereby

nonjudicial

Conclusion of Law #2

should therefore be stricken as being against law and in that
it unconstitutionally

impugns appellant Myers' right to

contract.
Conclusion of Law #3 should also be stricken for the same
reasons and grounds stated above for striking Conclusion of
Law #2.
Paragraph 1. of the trial court's Decree should be
stricken for the reason that there is no operative provision
in the Agreement requiring "marketable title" to be "turned
over" to Ms. Stringam.
Paragraph 2. of the trial court's Decree should be
stricken

for the reason that payment of Erin Stovall's

purported equitable lien is specifically indexed to the "time
of sale" at which time there was less than the threshold
amount due, viz., $108,200.
Paragraph 3. of the Decree, "[t]he balance then remaining
after paying the Trust Deed and Note and Ms. Stovall, should
be awarded to Morris Myers," should be stricken for the
reasons stated above for striking Paragraph 2. of the Decree,
and, as well, from a natural and reasonable interpretation of
13

the entire agreement, the manifest

meaning of the language

used by the parties, it must be concluded that the underlying
trust deed should only be paid from the proceeds of sale under
paragraph 11.A.
Paragraph 4. of the trial court's Decree should be in all
things stricken with the exception that the beginning two
lines [to the second coma, line two] should be retained as an
expression by the trial judge on the record for not awarding
fees to the prevailing party as required under the provisions
of subsection (1) Sec. 78-27-56 (1988) and Sec. 78-27-56 (2)
(b) (1988).

The balance of said paragraph 4. of the trial

court's Decree amounts to an abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial judge for reasons previously stated [the offer of
judgment mentioned was invalid for its demand for payment of
attorney's fees to date].
7* Conclusion: Quoting Justice Orme in his concurrence
in Commercial Investment Corp. v. Sigqard. 936 P.2d 1105, 1112
(Utah App. 1997)
court

or

even

"Without paying the [balloon payment] into
tender ing

[$134,043.24],

the

amount

due,

[Stringam] eventually sued for specific performance. Being in
material breach of

[her] obligations under the contract,

without excuse and without having tendered its performance,
[Stringam] simply was not entitled to specific performance of
the contract. In turn, [appellant Myers was] entitled to have
his title quieted against

[Stringam], which had lost its

rights under the contract by its long-standing material breach
14

and its failure to tender performance.w
Appellant Myers therefore prays

judgment dismissing

Stringam's cross-appeal; reversing the trial court's FINAL
ORDER AND JUDGMENT of January 31, 2000, and the ADDENDUM
thereto dated February 4, 2000, with the exception as stated
above respecting paragraph 4. of the trial Court's Decree of
January 31, 2000; and that the matter be remanded to the trial
court with directions to enter judgment quieting title in
appellant Myers, as well as for damages in appellant Myers
favor and against plaintiff Stringam as provided by law.
A copy of the Agreement sued on is appended hereto.
Respectfully submitted,
DATED July 24, 2000.

L
MORRIS MYERS, Appellant
Post Office Box 761
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: 801 755 2780
On July

*^ ^

, 2000, two true copies each mailed

as follows:
C. Val Morley
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Terry R* Spencer
140 West 9000 South, Suite 8
Sandy, Utah 84070
John Patrick Stovall
1159 East Garfield Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 m 5 _ ^

MORRIS MYERS
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ADDENDUM
Addendum One, AGREEMENT sued on
Addendum Two, FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT, January 31, 2000
Addendum Three, ADDENDUM TO FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER, February
4, 2000

AGREEMENT
JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT made this 1st day of August,
1990# by and between Wade and Jeanie Stringham/ of 98 West 500
North/ American Pork/ Utah 84002/ herein called First Party,
and Erin M. Stovall/ of 2511 South Chadwick/ Salt Lake City,
Utah 84106/ herein called Second Party/

WITNESSETH/ that

WHEREAS/ First and Second Parties are desirous of
entering into a joint venture arrangement respecting certain
real property at 98 West 500 North/ American Fork/ Utah/ and
WHEREAS/ the legal and record title to said property
is in Second Party and there is presently a trust deed incumbrance
(ARM) against the property in favor of American Charter/ of Omaha/
Nebraska/ upon which there is an approximate balance due of $105/00
with current monthly payments of $1225; and
WHEREAS/ First Party presently occupies the property
and the structuring of this joint venture contemplates the purchase
by First Party from Second Party of said property for $109/000 with
deferred payments of $1038 each month commencing August 1/ 1990/
and continuing for eighty-four months and that on August 1 # 1997/
the entire balance remaining unpaid will become due and owing/
payments to apply first to interest at the rate of 11% per annum
and then to principal; said joint venture contemplates that First
Party shall pay $800 each month to apply against the $1038. payment
and Second Party shall pay the difference; and
WHEREAS, First Party and Second Party intend hereby to
state their intentions and agreement as to the entitlement to
and distribution of profits in the event of sale of said property

which is the ultimate purpose of this joint venture, and to
provide termination and default provisions;
NOW, THEREFORE, First Party and Second Party agree
as follows:
1.

Second Party agrees to sell and First Party agrees,

to buy said real property;.
2.

First Party

to have possession as of August 1, 1990,

3.

First Party agrees to pay Second Party for the property

the purchase price of $109,000 on the following terms:

$800 each

month commencing August 1, 1990, for eighty-four months, and the*
entire balance remaining shall be due and payable on August 1, 1997i
interest on principal amounts remaining from time to time unpaid
shall be at the rate of 11% per annum.

As aforestated, the total

monthly payment for eighty-four months is $1038 but of that amount
Second Party shall pay $328 and shall also be responsible to pay
for and maintain fire and extended insurance coverages on said
property.
4.

Second Party agrees to pay taxes and assessments

which become due on said property.
5.

First Party agrees that it will neither commit nor

suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or
upon said property, and that First Party will maintain the property
in good condition.
6.

The parties agree that should either party default

in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained the prevailing party in litigation shall be entitled to all costs and expenses,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue

from enforcing or terminating this contract, or in obtaining
possession of the property, or in pursuing any remedy provided
hereunder or by applicable law.
7.

This agreement is binding

on the heirs, executorsf

administrators, personal representatives, successors or assigns
of the respective parties hereto.
8.

Should FIRST PARTY fail to comply with any of the

terms hereof, SECOND PARTY shall give FIRST PARTY written notice
specifically setting forth the provisions under which FIRST PARTY
is in default.

Should FIRST PARTY fail to cure such default

within 30 day after said notice, SECOND PARTY may, in addition to
any other remedies afforded SECOND PARTY by law, elect any of the
following remedies;
A. SECOND PARTY may be released from all obligations
in law and equity to convey the property, and FIRST PARTY shall
at once become a tenant at will of SECOND PARTY. All payments
which have been made by FIRST PARTY theretofore under this
agreement shall be retained by SECOND PARTY as liquidated and
agreed damages for breach of this agreement; provided, however,
that should payments of principal exceed 20% of the purchase
price plus SECOND PARTY'S accrued interest, fair rental value,
and a reasonable attorney's fees, then and in that event, FMch
excess shall be refunded to FIRST PARTY. This remedy shalx ue
available to SECOND PARTY from and after the time FIRST PARTY
shall have paid to SECOND PARTY 33 1/3% or more of the $109,000
purchase price.
B. SECOND PARTY may bring suit and recover judgment
for all delinquent installments and all reasonable costs and
attorney's fees, and the use of this remedy on one or more
occasions shall not prevent SECOND PARTY, at SECOND PARTY'S
option, from resorting to this or any other available remedy in
the case of subsequent default; or
C. SECOND PARTY may, upon written notice to FIRST
PARTY, declare the entire balance and accrued interest

hereunder at once due and payable and may elect to treat this
agreement as a note secured by a deed of trust, without

requirement of tender of legal title to FIRST PARTY, proceed
immediately to foreclosure in accordance with the laws of the
State of Utah applicable to trust deeds.
9.

It is agreed that time is of the essence of

this agreement.
10.

This agreement contains the entire agreement

between the parties hereto.

Any provisions hereof not

enforceable under the laws of the State of Utah shall not
effect the validity of any other provisions hereof*
11.

At such time as the property is sold the net

proceeds of the sale shall be distributed as follows:
A.

To payment of the underlying trust deed

indebtedness.
B.

The amount of the net proceeds as shall exceed

$109,000 shall be divided equally between First and Second
Parties.
C.

The amount of equity as determined by resort to

standard mortgage payback or amortization schedule (amount,
$109,000; amount of payment, $1038; annual interest rate, ll%f
payment frequency, monthly) shall be paid 77% to First Party
and 23% to Second Party.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF First And Second Parties have
hereunto affixed their hands and seals the day and year first
above written.

FIRST PARTY

SECOND PARTY

ASSIGNMENT OF AGREEMENT
The undersigned John Patrick Stovall, the owner and holder
of the within agreement, for valuable consideration receipt whereof is acknowledged by said John Patrick Stovall, assignor, hereby
and by these presents, does assign and transfer the said agreement,
together with the real property described therein, to Morris Myers,
Post Office Box 761, Nidvale, Utah 84047.
DATED August 9, 1994.

JOHN PATRICK STOVALL

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
CASAlft b £.\«TH. Cicrk

"Trey" A.R. Dayes, III, Bar no. 7504
C. Val Morley, Bar No. 6942
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801) 785-5350
Facsimile: (801)785-0853

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

STRINGAM, JEANNE,

]

Plaintiff,

])

FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT

l
]
i
]

Case No. 9704000100

V.

MYERS, MORRIS et al
Defendants.

Judge: Guy R. Burningham

This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on May 20, 1999 and June 28, 1999.
The Plaintiff appeared and was represented by counsel C. Val Morley, and 'Trey" A.R. Dayes III
Defendant, Morris Myers represented himself, as did Defendant John Patrick Stovall, Erin M. Stovall
was represented by counsel Terry R. Spencer. The Court thereupon heard evidence by the parties
and witnesses in support of their respective positions, reviewed the file, tape of the proceedings and
exhibits, and upon being advised in the premises, finds and concludes as follows:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Complaint wasfiledon February 3,1997, by Plaintiff, Jeannie Stringam. On October 8,1990,

Stringam entered into a real property lease/purchase agreement with Erin Stovall (then married to
Patrick Stovall). In this agreement Stringam agreed to make $800.00 monthly payments until August
1, 1997, when the balance of the trust deed note was to become due. If Stringam was ever unable
to make the payments, she had the option to sell the property and divide the equity with Erin Stovall.
Erin Stovall later transferred her interest in the property to John Patrick Stovall in a divorce
settlement, reserving one-half interest in the proceeds above $109,000.00 from the sale of the home.
John Stovall later transferred his interest to Morris Myers. Stringam continued to make the payments
(which were $800.00 of a $1,3038.00 mortgage payment) until October 22, 1996, when Stringam's
counsel mailed a letter to Myers offering to pay the outstanding balance of the trust deed note in full.
Defendant, Myers claims he is not required to allow the Plaintiff to refinance the property and
that he is entitled to one-half of the equity of the property upon completion of the terms of the
agreement. This is in contradiction-of the agreement, which contemplated such a division only if
Stringam sold the property before the end of the term of the agreement.
Stringam asked the Court for (1) Specific Performance, requiring Myers to accept the
tender payment in full of the outstanding balance of the trust deed note, (2) Declaratory Judgment
that Stringam may seek refinancing and pay the balance of the trust deed note without incurring any
penalty, or dividing equity with Myers; (3) Quiet Title requiring Myers to cooperate in transferring
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title to Stringam.
2.

MyersfiledAnswer on February 25, 1997. He denied every allegation in the Complaint and

listed three Counterclaims. He claims the parties entered into a joint venture and that he was
damaged in the amount of $100,000.00. He claims that the joint venture was formed for the purpose
of selling the property to a third person and distributing the proceeds according to the terms of the
agreements. He also claims that by refusing to sell the property to a third person, Stringam is
violating thefiduciaryrelationship that exists between the parities.
3.

StringamfiledMotion to Strike Answer and Counterclaim on March 5, 1997.

4.

Myers, represented by Larry L. Whyte,fileda Motion to Leave to Amend answer and

Counterclaim on March 20, 1997 The parties later stipulated to allow Myers to file his Amended
Answer and Counterclaim.
5.

StringamfiledAnswer and Counterclaim on April, 29, 1997.

6.

StringamfiledMotion to Allow Substitute Performance and Offer to Tender Balance into

Court. Stringam asked to tender $104,000.00 to the Court since the deadline for the payment
was approaching and counsel for Myers was not authorized to sign a stipulation for substitute
performance. Stringam was concerned that Myers would not honor the agreement and accept
the funds, hence the tender to the Court before the deadline of August 1, 1997.
7.

MyersfiledObjection to Motion to Allow Substitute Performance on August 18, 1997.

Myers claimed the offer to tender was vague, untimely, and not for the full amount due and
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owing, but did not indicate a balance he believed was owning
8

Stringam file Response to the Objection on September 24, 1997 Stringam's offer was

timely and was made to keep Myers from claiming she had defaulted on the loan Furthermore,
under UCA§ 78-27-1, a written offer is deemed to be an actual production and tender of the
payment if the defendant refuses to accept the offer
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written
instrument or specific personal property is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual
production and tender of the money, instrument or property
9

Oral arguments were held on October 1, 1997, before Judge Eyre, who found that

Stnngam had attempted to make a tender offer She was ordered to tender $109,000 00 to the
Court by October 7, 1997 Myers could petition the Court to withdraw the money to make the
payments on the underlying trust deed The Defendant would be responsible for the underlying
trust deed payments
10

Stringam filed Motion for Expedited Declaratory Relief Requiring Defendant to Tender

Title into Court on October 16, 1999 Stringam argued that she deposited the funds into Court,
but Myers did not provide any indicia that he had clear title to the property Stringam asked the
Court to order title be transferred to Stringam and allow Myers to receive a trust deed in the
property to protect his interest in any additional amounts the Court may determine Myers in
entitled to receive
11

Myers filed Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Expedited Declaratory Relief on
4

October 31, 1997. Myers claimed the amount due to him is $134,000.00, not $109,000.00.
Further it is argued that Stringam did not tender this amount to the Court and is now in default.
12.

Stringam filed a reply to the Memo in Opposition for Expedited Declaratory Relief on

November 6, 1997. Stringam paid $109,000.00 into the Court, which was addressed by the
Court. Myers never established hisrightto the funds and has not yet furnished proof of his ability
to provide Stringam with clear title. Furthermore, the amount of the balloon payment is one of
the grounds of litigation. The agreement was so unclear that it required judicial interpretation as
to how to compute the balance due. Myers drafted the agreement in question. [[[Though Myers
claimed that Stringam admitted $134,000.00 was the amount owed, Stringam's position is that
she admitted she would be willing to tender this amount if he would give her clear title He has
never shown he can give title, and Stringam has not agreed that this is the proper amount due.]]]
13.

The parties came before the Court on December 1, 1997. Stringam was allowed to

withdraw her funds from the Court. She was ordered to pay $32.84 per day in interest from
August 1, 1997 through the day she-withdraws the money. Stringam was also ordered to pay the
full mortgage amount of $1,038.00. (Mr. Morley drafted the Order and changed the interest
payment to $50.00.)
14.

Erin StovallfiledMotion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order and

Request for Fees on March 9, 1997. Erin moved for a protective order that her deposition not be
has on the grounds that she is a resident of Salt Lake and has been subpoenaed to appear in Utah
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County. She claimed this is necessary to protect her from undue burden and expense.
15.

Stringam filed Motion to Amend Complaint on March 10, 1998. During the course of

discovery Stringam learned that Erin and Patrick Stovall still have an interest in the property.
Erin filed a Notion of Lis Pendens on October 22, 1997.
16.

Myers filed Motion for Summary Judgment on March 13, 1998. The Summary Judgment

stated that Stingam had not paid the balloon payment, she had defaulted and therefore, summary
judgment was appropriate for Myers. Myers claimed Stringam defaulted by not paying the flinds
on August 1, 1997. Myers then sent her a letter advising her she was in default and gave her 30
days to tender payment. Myers then claimed that after several letters between counsel, Stringam
filed the Motion to Allow Substitute Performance and Offer to Tender Balance. In actuality,
Stringamfiledthe Motion to Allow Substitute Performance in July, several days before the
August 1 deadline. Stringam filed this Motion because she was concerned that Myers would not
accept the payments she was making. In addition, Stringam asked the Court to determine what
the balloon payment should be because Myers either didn't tell her, or named an amount that
seemed high and couldn't be reconciled with the agreement.
17.

StringamfiledMemo in Opposition to Erin StovalPs Motion to Quash Subpoena on

March 16, 1998. Stringam claimed service was proper, and that since Erin conducted business in
Utah County, her appearance in Utah County is proper.
18.

Motion to Quash is Granted and Order is entered on March 16, 1998. She was also
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awarded attorney fees and costs in the sum of $200.00.
19.

The Order on Stringam's Motion to Amend Complaint was signed on March 20, 1998.

20.

StringamfileAmended Complaint on March 10, 19998 naming Erin and John Patrick

Stovall.
21.

Myers filed Objection to Motion and Amend Complaint on March 25, 1998. Myers

claimed the Stovalls have no interest and allowing them to be added will only cause undue delay
and prejudice.
22.

StringamfileRule 56(f) Motion to Conduct Additional Discovery prior to being required

to file a memo in opposition to Myer's Motion for Summary Judgment. Stringam asserted that
through Myers claimed he sent Notice of Default to Stringam regarding the balloon payment,
neither she not her counsel received it. Stringam pointed out there were numerous issues of
material fact in dispute, including some required additional discovery.
23.

On May 4, 1998, Morris Myers submitted notice that Larry Whyte would no longer be

representing him and the he would be-representing himself
24.

Larry Whyte submits Notice of Withdraw of Counsel on May 4 , 1998. Myers also filed

Notice of Withdraw of Summary Judgment on May 4, 1998.
25.

Myers filed Answer to Stringam's Amended Complaint on May 8 ,1998. Myers denied

each and every allegation and claimed Stringam forfeited any right to interest she has in the
property by failing to make the balloon payment. He also claimed he is the only person with any
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interest in the property.
26.

A Default Certificate was entered in error on May 18, 1998, against Erin Stoval for failing

to answer the Complaint.
27.

Erin Stovallfiledan Answer on May 14, 1998.

28.

MyersfiledAnswer to Amended Complaint on June 28, 1998, with two Counterclaims.

He sues for Quiet Title against Stringam because she hasn't yet paid the balloon payment. And he
sues for eviction and damages, claiming she is unlawful detainer of the property. He also crossclaims for declaratory relief against Erin Stovall for the lis pendens action.
29.

StringamfiledObjection to Filing of and Motion to Strike Myers 2nd Amended Answer on

July 14, 1998. Myers had already answered the Amended Complaint on May 8, 1998. He cannot
file an Amended Answer without leave of Court.
30.

MyersfiledReply to the Objection to Filing of and Motion to Strike on July 28, 1998.

The Order allowing the Amended Complaint was signed before there was an opportunity for
hearing on the amended complaint and "therefore the same is void as in violation of the 14th
Amendment Due Process right to an 'meaningful opportunity to be heard.'" Bodie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971). Myers then moved the Court for an order vacating the March Order.
He also claims the amended Complaint is a procedural nonentity, making the Answer a nonentity
as well.
31.

John Patrick Stovall filed Answer to Amended Complaint on September 14, 1998.
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32.

Morris Myers and Patrick Stovall filed Joint Motion for Summary Judgment on September

22, 1998, contending that the balloon payment was due but was not paid, and this was a material
breach.
33.

The parties appeared before Judge Eyre on October 7, 1998. The parties stipulated to

allow Myers to amend his answer and counterclaim, and the Court denied the Motion to Strike.
Trial was set for February 9-10, 1999.
34.

Stringam filed Answer to John Patrick Stovall's Counterclaims on October 2, 1998.

35.

Erin StovallfiledResponse to the Motion for Summary judgement on October 5, 1998.

She did not object to summary judgment being entered as long as her interest is not damaged.
36.

Stringam filed a Rule(f) Motion to Conduct Additional Discovery in Order to Supplement

her Opposition to the Joint Motion for Summary Judgment. Myers and Stovall had not provided
documents showing how and when Stovall's interest in the property was transferred to Myers.
There are factual issues precluding Summary Judgment.
37.

Notice to Submit on Joint Motion for Summary judgment isfiledon October 16, 1998.

38.

The Rule(f) Motion to Conduct Additional Discovery was Granted by the Court on

October 26, 1998 in Memorandum Decision. Stringam has until December 1, 1998 tofilea
responsive pleading. At that time either party could file a Notice to Submit the Motion for
Decision.
39.

Order on Stringam's Motion to Strike Myer's Amended Answer is signed by the Court on
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November 12, 1998. The parties stipulated to allow Myers to file his amended Answer. The
Court agreed that this would be the final amended Answer and Counterclaim to be filed.
40.

Stringam filed Supplemental Memo in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment

on December 1, 1998. Stringam lists several factual issues. The nature of the agreement is in
dispute: (1) the text of the agreement does not reflect that is was a join venture agreement. It was
a real estate purchase agreement between Erin Stovall and the Stringams. (2) Myers has not
produced an assignment from Erin Stovall. (3) Myers has produced an alleged assignment and
deed from John Patrick Stovall, but there is an issue of fact as to whether or not he is the owner
of the agreement or has any rights, since the divorce decree gives Erin the right to V2 of all
amounts received from the home over $109,000.00.
A second factual issue related to the balloon payment amount. Stringam claims she owes
$109,000.00, Myers claims $134,000.00. The language in the contract is ambiguous. Neither
Stovall nor Myers were parties to the agreement. There is no evidence that Erin transferred her
interest to Patrick Stovall. Furthermore, any statement from Myers regarding the parties' original
intent are not admissible because he was not present. Finally, even Patrick Stovall cannot provide
a payoff amount. He did admit that Myers drafted the original agreement, so any ambiguities
should be construed against Myers.

The final factual issue concerns the balloon payment. In spite of Myer's claims that
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Stringam defaulted, she did tender the funds to the Court and she asked to do this several days
before it was necessary.
41.

StringamfiledMotions to Compel against Patrick Stovall and Myers on December 21,

1998. The motion against Myers specifically targets paragraph 14 of his allegation that he has
been responsible for the payment of $238.00 of the mortgage. Stringam asks that judgment by
default be entered against Myers and that he be prohibited from introducing evidence regarding
paragraph 14 unless he responds to the interrogatories within 10 days of the Order.
42.

MyersfiledMemo in Opposition to the Motion to Compel on December 22, 1998. Myers

claimed that Stringam has conducted discovery in a manner to harass, inconvenience and injure
Myers. He rests on the argument that Stringam is in default and has not paid the balloon payment
that is owed.
43.

StringamfiledMotion for Summary Judgment against Morris Myers on December 24,

1998. Stringam argued that Myers may not assert greater right than was granted to him by
Patrick Stovall. Myers claims he received hisrightto the property from Patrick Stovall. Thus
any right he had to the property is no greater than therightPatrick Stovall had. Stringam asks for
Summary Judgment that Myer's right is no greater than the right granted by Patrick Stovall.
44.

StringamfiledMotion for Summary Judgment against John Patrick Stovall on December

24, 1998. Stringam argues that any interest Mr. Stovall has was assigned to Myers.
45.

StringamfiledOffer of Judgment on December 28, 1998, offering $150,000 for which
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judgment could be entered. Defendant would agree to pay costs.
46.

Myers filed Memo in Opposition to the Motion to Compel on December 18, 1998. He

relies on the argument that Stringam failed to pay the balloon payment and is in default. He also
argues contract law, i.e. that a court may not rewrite a term of a contract by interpretation when
the meaning is clear. He claims the agreement concerning the balloon payment was clear and
unambiguous.
47.

Stringam files Replies to Myers' and StovalPs Opposition to the Motions to Compel.

Myers complains that the requests are abusive, harassing and inconvenient, nevertheless Stringam
has made only one request for interrogatories that was calculated to discover admissible evidence.
The objection is without sufficient grounds. The request are proper. Stringam questions what
legal right Myers has to the property in question, what other reasons Myers is alleging the he has
in support of his counterclaim and what evidence he has that he has been making the mortgage
payments.
48.

Counsel for Erin Stovallfiled*Motionto Continue on January 25, 1999, asking that the

dates be continued because he is a Utah State Senator and cannot prepare or attend pre-trial
conferences for the trial. The Court later granted the Motion and charged that the trial dates to
April 4, 1999.
49.

Myers filed Application to the Clerk for Certification of Default pursuant to Rule 55 (d),

claiming Stringam failed to reply to his Counterclaims.
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50.

Myers' Certificate of Default was entered on February 2, 1999.

51.

Stringam filed Request for Ruling on her Motions for Summary Judgment against Myers

and Stovall and Motions to Compel against Myers and Stovall.
52.

Stringam filed Motion to Set Aside Default on March 24, 1999. Stringam argued that

when Myers fourth amended answer was filed, she had asked in her objection that she would be
relieved of any obligation to answer the pleading, since the issues had already been answered
before. The understanding of Laramie Merritt, who was in oral arguments, was that Stringam
was not to file additional pleadings after the amended answer Furthermore, the allegations in the
counterclaim have been answered. In addition, Rule 5(a)(1) requires every paper, motion, notice,
etc. be served on all parties. Myers was not relieved of that duty until "after the entry of default."
Myers should have served Stringam. Stringam has shown more than good cause for setting the
entry of default aside.
53.

Stringam filed Answer to the Amended Answer and Counterclaim on March 24, 1999.

Myers filed Memo in Opposition andObjection to the Motion to Set Aside Default on March 29
,1999. Myers argued there is no showing of just cause for opening the default nor reasonable
excuse for Plaintiffs failure to reply to his counterclaim. He argued further that Stringam had not
tendered the balloon payment, not substantially complied with the agreement.
54.

The parties appeared before the Court on March 31, 1999. Plaintiffs Motion for

Summary Judgement concerning Mr. Stovall was granted. Summary Judgement concerning Mr.
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Myers, and Mr. Myers Motion for Summary Judgement were taken under advisement.
55.

The Court entered a Memorandum Decision on April 12, 1999, where Plaintiffs Motion

to Set Aside was granted. The summary Judgement concerning Mr. Myers, and Mr. Meyers
Motion for Summary Judgement were denied.
56.

Stringamfileda Notice of Intent to Use Prior Criminal Convictions for Impeachment

Purposes on April 23, 1999.
57.

Myersfileda Motion to Strike and Vacate the Ruling of October 28, 1997, on June 23,

1999, claiming that he was denied due process. Myers argued the discrepancy between the
$109,000 determined by the court, and $134,000 the alleged correct figure, amounted to the
Court rewriting the terms of the agreement.
Stringamfileda Memorandum in Opposition to Myer's Motion to Strike, on July 8, 1999.
Stringham asserted that Myers' due process rights were not violated because he did have notice,
and order was not in error.
58.

The case came before the Court for trial on June 28, 1999. Counsel for Erin M. Stovall

submitted Closing Arguments on July 2, 1999. Counsel for Jeannie Stringham submitted Closing
Arguments and Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions on July 19, 1999. Myers never submitted Closing
Arguments.
59.

Myers submitted his Post-trial Motions and supporting memorandum on July 15, 1999.

Myers asserts that Plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed because she has shown no right to
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relief Further Myers moves the court for an order striking the testimony of Plaintiffs expert
(accountant), claiming that the parties intent is the best evidence to establish the terms of the
contract, and that the contact is not ambiguous. Myers further moves the Court for an order that
said contact and all rights of the plaintiff thereunder, are forfeited since she didn't make the
balloon payment. Myers asks that the evidence and testimony as to his embezzlement conviction
be stricken, as it illustrates no criminal conduct or mortal turpitude, while being prejudicial.
Finally Myers asks for an order releasing the copy of Petition for Writ of Certiorari to him.
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Myers' Post-trial Motions was filed July 29, 1999.
Myers' Reply was submitted on August 10, 1999.
60.

Plaintiffs response to Erin M. Stovall's Closing Arguments were filed on August 4, 1999.

61.

Plaintiffs Counsel submitted a Request for Ruling on August 23, 1999.

The Court entered a Ruling as to Myers Post-trial Motions on September 8, 1999. The Court
denied Myers' Motion to Dismiss the claim as unsupported. The Court denied Myers' request for
an Order striking the testimony of Plaintiff s expert witness. The Court also refused to find that
Plaintiffs rights has been forfeited under the contract. Furthermore, the Court denied
Defendant's Motions to find that Plaintiff did not tender the balloon payment, and motion to
strike the evidence as to his embezzlement convictions. The Court granted Myers' request for the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to be released to himself. Finally the Court denied the Defendant's
Motion to Vacate the Order of October 28, 1997. Myers still filed no Closing Arguments a
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requested by the Court, but has appealed rulings on motions, rather than waiting for final ruling
and judgement.

DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS
At issue in this case is whether the agreement entered into between the parties constituted
a joint venture or a lease/option to buy. Testimony was presented at trial that Ms. Stringam, and
Ms. Stovall, believed the agreement to be a lease/option to buy. Mr. Myers and Mr. Stovall
assert that the agreement was a joint venture. Mr. Myers drafted the agreement and therefore,
according to case law ambiguities should be construed against Mr. Myers. Trolley Square Assoc.
v. Nelson 886 P 2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The fact that ambiguities are interpreted against the
drafter's interests, supports the position that this contract is a lease/option to buy.
Likewise, the language of the contact supports the position that the contact is a lease/option to
buy. "Second party agrees to sell and First Party agrees to buy said real property". This language
taken on its face seems to indicate a lease/option to buy. Finally, Ms. Stovall who has no interest
in the interpretation of the agreement, also believed the contact to be a lease/option to buy. The
language of the contact, and the intention and actions of the parties, establish that the agreement
was to lease/option to buy.
Being a lease/option to buy contract, Ms. Stringam has the right to purchase the property
herself by paying the balloon payment. The Court finds Ms. Stringam is not in default for failing
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to make the balloon payment. Ms. Stringam attempted numerous times to try to ascertain the
amount required for the balloon payment. Ms. Stringam went further and made offers to
Defendant Myers for the balloon payment. Myers continually avoided the Plaintiff and refused to
let her perform her obligation under the agreement. According to Utah Code Ann.§ 78-27-1;
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument or
specific personal property is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual production and
tender of the money, instrument or property.

Myers cannot frustrate an attempt by Stringam to perform and then fault her for failing to
perform. Forfeiture is a harsh remedy and should not be imposed where Defendant's own acts
caused delays. Plaintiff began well ahead of the due date to ascertain the balloon amount,
therefore Ms. Stringam has the right to make balloon and perform on the contract.
The balloon payment amount has been the subject of much controversy. Defendant has
made assertions that the calculation for the balloon payment was one that anyone could do.
Defendant testified he failed to give them a sum foe the balloon payment and stated "....Well, I
thought you could compute it yourself. Trial transcript June 28, 1999 pg 49 line 14. Contrary
to Mr. Myers' testimony it appears that even he himself had difficulty determining the sum. The
numbers quoted in documents submitted to the court, varied with at least four differing sums
named. The Court has established that the sum is ambiguous and evidence and expert testimony
regarding the calculation was proper. The calculation for the balloon payment is further
complicated by the nature of the agreement, that of a lease/option to buy with negative
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amortization. Jude Eyre determined the payment to be a minium of $109,000 in the order on
October 28, 1997. Mr. Myers asserts that taking into account the negative amortization, the true
payment is $134,618.57. Plaintiff argue the balloon payment should be set at $104,211.75.
Plaintiff support this assertion under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-3, which requires that if an
objection "... is to the amount of money, terms of the instrument or the amount or kind of
property, he must specify the amounts, terms or kind which he requires, or be precluded from
objection afterwards". Plaintiff contend that since Ms. Stringam made a valid legal tender offer of
$104,211.75, and that Mr. Myers failed to specify the amount of money required in his objection.
Since he did not specify the amount Plaintiff argues he is bound by the amount of PlaintifTs tender
offer.
Regarding Ms. StovalPs interest in the property, the Court earlier ruled through summary
judgement that the interest Mr. Stovall had in the property was assigned to Morris Myers.
However through the divorce decree of Mr. And Mrs. Stovall, Mrs. Stovall retained an interest in
the property constituting Vi of all proceeds received for the property over $109,000. "...Plaintiff
is awarded an equitable lein against the American Fork property in the sum of one-half of all
proceeds received in excess of $109,000, which lein should become payable upon the sale of the
real property". Therefore if the amount of the balloon payment is over $109,000 there is the issue
of whether Mrs. Stovall has an interest in Vi of those proceeds. Mr. Myers has asserted that the
amount of the balloon payment should be $134,618.57. Mr. Myers asserts that Ms. Stovall has
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no interest in the amount of the proceeds received above $109,000, in that the true selling amount
is $109,000, and the amount above that equal to $134,618.57 is simply the interest resulting from
the negative amortization. It is consistent that any amount over the selling price due to interest
accrued as a result of the negative amortization, still constitutes proceeds of the sale. Therefore
Ms. Stovall is entitled to Vi of the balloon payment amount over $109,000.
Plaintiffs expert witness, an accountant offered another sum computed from his
understanding of the contract terms and the added another element of the negative amortization.
Based on his interpretation, the Court determines the balloon payment to be $134,043.24, as of
August 1, 1997. Plaintiff continued to pay $800.00 per month until December 1997, when she
began paying $ 1038.00 per month. Plaintiffs pay off as of January 1, 2000 is $141,547.21 under
the agreement $32,547.21 represents proceeds in excess of $109,000, one half of these proceeds
should be awarded to Ms. Stovall, or $16,273.61. The first mortgage (trust deed and note)
should be satisfied first from the $141,547.21, then Ms. StovalPs award of $ 16,273.61, and the
balance remaining should be awarded'to Morris Myers.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The contract between the parties is a lease/option to buy.

2.

Ms. Stringam has a right to tender payment of the final balloon payment thereby

performing and fulfilling her obligation on the contract.
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3.

The amount of the balloon payment is determined to be $141,547 21, as of January 1,

2000.
THE COURT HEREBY DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1. Once Ms. Stringam has tendered the balloon payment the first mortgage (Trust Deed and
Note) should be satisfied and Mr. Myers shall turn over marketable title to Ms Stringam.
2.

One-half of all proceeds over the amount of $109,000 should be paid tp Ms. Stovall in

satisfaction of her lien/interest in the property, this amount being $16,273.61.
3.

The balance then remaining after paying the Trust Deed and Note and Ms. Stovall, should

be awarded to Morris Myers.
4.

Due to the fact that the parties involved in this dispute contributed to or created their own

difficulties in this matter, each party should pay their own attorneys fees and costs, with the
exception that Plaintiffs offer of judgement in December of 1998 for $150,000.00 if accepted
could have avoided the necessity of trial. Therefore a portion of costs and attorney fees
associated with the trial of this matter should be awarded to Plaintiff. The Court determines Ms.
Stringam should receive $12,000.00 of her costs and attorney fees, from Defendant Myers.
DATED at Provo, Utah

ft^^l^/,
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE
To:

Terry R Spencer, Morris Myers, John Patrick Stovall
Attorney for Defendant, Defendants Pro Se
Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for respondent will submit the above and

foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER to the for signature upon the expiration of five (5)
days from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed
prior to that time pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
DATED this

'*'

day of / K^'CCC olt q

, 2000.

/

DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P C

c^4

TREV>JE£1}AYES HI
Attorney for Plaintiff
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL
JUDGMENT AND ORDER, postage prepaid by first-class mail, on this {,>' "day of January,
2000, to the following:

Terry R. Spencer
Attorney at Law
140 West 9000 South, Suite 8
Sandy, Utah 84070
Morris Myers
P.O. Box 761
Midvale, Utah 84047
John Patrick Stovall
1159 East Garfield Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
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C ValMorley,BarNo. 6942
"Trey" A.R. Dayes III, Bar No. 7504
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.
Attorneys for Jeannie Stringam
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801) 785-5350
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo. Utah 84601

JEANNIE STRINGAM,
ADDENDUM TO FINAL JUDGMENT
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 970400100

MORRIS MYERS, ERIN M. STOVALL,
aka ERIN M. BISNER STOVALL, JOHN
PATRICK STOVALL,

Judge' Guy R. Burningham

Defendants.

After discussion in chambers^vith counsel C. Val Morley on behalf of the Plaintiff, Terry
R. Spencer on behalf of Erin Stovall appearing via telephone, and Defendant Morris Myers pro se
appearing via telephone, for purposes of clarification the Court adds and clarifies its Findings, and
Final Judgment and Order as follows:
L

The ambiguity created by the negative amortization terms of the contract at issue,

left the Court with the responsibility to determine the correct amount of the final balloon payment.
Plaintiff argued that the balloon payment amount should be set at $104,211.74 citing Utah Code
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Ann. § 78-27-3, which requires that if an objection "...is to the amount of money, terms of the
instrument or the amount or kind of property, he must specify the amounts, terms or kind which
he requires, or be precluded from objection afterwards." Plaintiff asserts that since Ms. Stringam
made a valid legal tender offer of $ 104,211.74 , and Mr. Myers failed to specify the amount of
money required in his objection, he is bound by the amount of Plaintiffs tender offer.
When this matter came before the Court, Mr. Myers claimed that Ms. Stringam didn't
make the balloon payment and therefore made no tender. The Courtfindsthat Ms. Stringam
attempted to tender payment by the deadline specified in the contract and the Court gives Ms.
Stringam the benefit of her proffered tender and its timeliness. Furthermore although Mr. Myers
objected to the tender, he failed to specify the nature of his objection. Mr. Myers objection to the
tender failed to state an amount, said amount being in dispute. Therefore the Court finds that Mr.
Myers is precluded from objecting to the propriety of the tender because he failed to specify the
amount necessary to make tender sufficient.
However, the amount of the tender was inadequate, with Ms. Stringam offering tender of
an amount clearly insufficient. There is no waiver where a full tender is not made. Therefore, Mr.
Myers is precluded under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-3 from making the claim that Ms. Stringam
made no tender, but Ms. Stringam is precluded from binding Mr. Myers to the tendered amount
where that amount and her fulfillment of the contract is in dispute.
2.

The Court finds the prevailing party in this litigation has arightto attorneys fees

Page 2 of 6

pursuant to paragraph six of the Agreement (Exhibit A) between the parties which states in
pertinent part:
The parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or
agreements herein contained the prevailing party in litigation shall be entitled to all
costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise ro
accrue from enforcing or terminating this contract or in obtaining possession of the
property in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law.
3.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this ligation and

therefore has arightto attorneys fees and costs from December 21, 1998, the date Plaintiff
extended to Myers her offer of judgment.

FINAL JUDGMENT ADDENDUM
It is hereby ORDERED ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
1.

The amount of the Balloon payment shall remain $ 141,547.21.

2.

Plaintiff is awarded attorneys feesfromDecember 21, 1998.

3.

Within 30 days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff shall pay $ 141,547.21 to the

"Title Company" of her choosing with instructions to the Title Company to disburse the $
141,547.21 as follows:
a.

To Terry R. Spencer in trust for Erin Stovall in the amount of $ 16,273.61.

b.

To the underlying mortgage holder on the property, payment in full of the
underlying mortgage as per lender's payoff amount.

c.

Duval Hansen Witt & Morley, P.C. in trust for Plaintiff, attorneys fees
from December 21, 1998.

d.

To Morris Myers the remainder of funds.
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4.

After payment of $ 141,547.21 to the Title Company, disbursement of funds by the

Title Company, and the filing with the Court of an Aifidavit by the Title Company stating that
funds have been distributed according to this order, title to the property at 98 West 500 North
American Fork, Utah also know as:
COM. SW COR BLK 52, Plat A, American Fork City SR; N 110 Ft; E 138 FT; S
110 FT; W 138 FT to BEG,
shall be quieted in Plaintiff Jeannie Stringam
5.

And it is further ordered that Plaintiffs judgment shall be augmented in the amount

of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or
otherwise, or still owed after disbursement of funds, as shall be established by affidavit.
DATED:

/5fZ3 ^ , Tj&Q-t)

.

niy K. tfurningar
Fourth District Court JudgeC
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE
To:

Terry R. Spencer, Morris Myers, John Patrick Stovall
Attorney for Defendant, Defendant Pro Se
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney for the Plaintiff will submit the

above and foregoing ADDENDUM TO FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER to the Court for
signature upon the expiration of five (5) day from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days for
mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah
Rules of Judicial Administration.
DATED

/ h e / V Q

.

DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, PC.

^TREY'^AJ^5f^ESin
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTD7ICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on

[ 7 0 1 0 0

_ I caused a true and correct copy of this

ADDENDUM TO FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER, to be mailed via first class to:
Terry R. Spencer
Attorney at Law
140 West 9000 South, Suite 8
Sandy, Utah 84070
Morris Myers
P.O. Box 761
Midvale,Utah 84047
John Patrick Stovall
1159 East Garfield Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105

ORLEY, PC.
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August 1, 2000
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
RE:

AUG 0 3 2000

COURT OF APPEALS

Stringam v. Myers,
Case No. 20000179-CA, citation of supplemental authority,
Utah R.App.P. 24(i)

From the case of BA Mortg. & Intern. Realty v. American Nat. Bank,
706 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. 111. 1989), the following should be
included after the first paragraph under the heading Nature of the
Case, Brief of Appellant, p. 6, [BA Mortg., 706 F.Supp, page 1371],
"A joint venture is an association of two or more persons to
carry out a single enterprise for profit. . . . The
relationship between joint venturers, like that existing
between partners, is fiduciary in character and imposes upon
the participants an obligation of loyalty and good faith in
their dealings with each other with respect to the enterprise.
. . . The relationship is governed by the legal principles to
partnerships.
11

. . . [T]he attributes that determine the existence of

the jural relationship [are],
11

(1) an express or implied agreement to carry on some
enterprise; (2) a manifestation of intent by the parties to be
associated as joint venturers; (3) a joint interest as shown
by the contribution of property, financial resources, effort,
skill or knowledge by each joint venturer; (4) some degree of
joint proprietorship or mutual right to exercise control over
the enterprise; and (5) provision for the joint sharing of
profits and losses.

"The existence of a joint venture may be inferred from facts
and circumstances showing such an enterprise was in fact
entered into . . . and the intent of the parties is the most
significant element.
"Whether or not a joint venture exists is a question for the
trier of fact as he is in the best position to judge the
credibility of the witness.
"In this instance it is unnecessary to go beyond "*the most
significant element7": the intent of the parties. Here the

[Agreement] specifically provides []: "'Whereas, First and
Second Parties are desirous of entering into a joint venture
arrangement respecting certain real property at 98 West 500
North, American Fork, Utah, . . .'"
The case [citation] is submitted because it contains
definitional terms relevant to the case before the Court.

cc:

Morley
Spencer

Enc:
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